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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1988, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (The Convention) became law in the United States.
The Convention governs the formation of, and rights and duties under,
international sale of goods contracts between contracting parties located in
nations which have adopted the Convention. The parties to such contracts,
however, may exclude or vary the application of the Convention's provisions.'
After briefly surveying the obligations of the buyer and the remedies of
the seller under the Convention and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),
this paper analyzes two uncertainties resulting from these provisions. The first
* B.A. Fordham University; J.D. University of Miami School of Lw.
'Under Art. 6, the parties may exclude the application of the Convention or vary the effect of
any of its provisions. The United States has declared such a reservation under the authority of
Article 95. See Kathrein & Magreaw, The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods: An Update, 23 INT'L LAW. 797, 798 (1989). Article 95 allows the Nations to abrogate
the provisions of Article 1 (1)(b). The resulting effect of such an reservation by the United States
is: the Convention will not necessarily apply when the rules of private international law lead to
application of the law of a Contracting State. However, this paper addresses only the buyer's
obligations and the seller's remedies. For more general commentary on the Convention, see JOHN
0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION (1982) [hereinafter, HONNOLD COMMENTARY], PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM
SALES LAW-THE U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
(1986) [hereinafter, SCHLECHTRIEM].
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is whether an "open-price" contract may be validly concluded under the
Convention in light of the apparent conflict between Articles 14 and 55. The
second is whether, and to what extent, the remedy of specific performance is
available to the seller in the United States under the UN Sales Convention.
II. SURVEY OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
The obligations of the buyer and the remedies of the seller are set forth in
Articles 53 to 65 of the Convention. While these sections of the Convention
parallel the U.C.C. concerning such issues as acceptance, payment, and
cooperation, the duties of each party under the convention differ in several
respects. The Convention's provisions at this point are divided respectively into
those addressing the buyer's obligation to pay and to take delivery.
A. Obligations of the Buyer
Article 53 of the Convention states the two basic obligations of the buyer:
"The buyer must pay the price for the goods and take delivery of them as
required by the contract and this Convention." This is stated in essentially the
same language as U.C.C. § 2-301: "The obligation of ... the buyer is to accept
and pay in accordance with the contract." In this respect, some divergence
exists between the U.C.C. and the Convention: the Convention specifically
increases the obligati6ns of the buyer. For example, under Article 60 the buyer
is required to do "all the acts which could reasonably be expected of him in
order to enable the seller to make delivery." The duties of the buyer are also
increased by Article 54, which deals with issues of payment. Under Article 54
the buyer must "[take] such steps and [comply] with such formalities' as may be
required under the contract or any laws and regulations to enable payment to be
made." Because the Convention, unlike the U.C.C., includes these preliminary
steps in the obligation to pay, the buyer's "non-performance lof such steps] is
[viewed, under the Convention, as] an actual rather than an anticipatory
breach. "2 Furthermore, Article 54 exemplifies one of the principles of the
Convention, namely, an obligation of "cooperation"3 and "communication
' 4
2 Tallon, Obligations Under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 7.02, at 7-6 n.6 (N. Galston & H. Smit eds. 1984). [hereinafter
TALLON]. Note also that "[p]erformance of such acts in some cases depends only on the buyer's
diligence; in others, it needs an administrative authorization, and here, the buyer cannot be held
liable for a refusal of such authorization as long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain it."
Id. at 7-6.
3 See HONNOLD COMMENTARY, supra note 1, § 323 at 335: "The Convention at many points
responds to the fact that consummating an international sale calls for cooperation; each party must
take steps that are related to corresponding steps by the other." See also, id., § 323 at 335 n.1:
"E.g., Arts. 19(2), 21(2), 32(2)&(3), 48(2), 58(3), 60(a), 65, 71, 73(2), 79(4), and 85-88. It may
add a bit of romance to commercial law to suggest an analogy to old-fashioned ballroom dancing."
4 Id. § 100 at 131: "These provisions may well evidence a general principle calling for
communication of information that is obviously needed by a trading partner .... "
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respecting performance. A similar obligation is also implied in the heading of
U.C.C. §2-311 ("Options and Cooperation Respecting Performance"). 5
Articles 55-59 of the Convention cover other matters related to the
obligations of the buyer. The significance of Article 55, which deals with open-
price contracts, is discussed in greater depth below. Articles 56-58 are default
rules governing issues of payment, which in practice would be resolved by most
agreements. Where the price is fixed according to weight, it is to be determined
by the net weight, unless otherwise agreed (Article 56). The place and time for
payment are set by Articles 57 through 59. Article 57 directs payment to be
made at the seller's place of business. The exception to this is when there is a
simultaneous exchange of goods for money (immediate payment). In such a case,
payment is to be made at the place where the buyer receives the goods.6 The
U.C.C. approach differs in this respect. Under the U.C.C., a simultaneous
exchange of goods for money is the rule rather than the exception. In fact,
under U.C.C. § 2-310(a) the buyer pays at the time and place he receives the
goods - it is irrelevant whether the place of shipment is the place of delivery.
Unlike the general rule of the Convention (Art.57(1)(a)), this place will not
necessarily be the seller's place of business. In this respect, the Convention is
friendlier than the U.C.C. to sellers wary of the risk of having to receive
payment in a foreign country.7 But under U.C.C. §2-310(c), if delivery is to
be made by documents of title, payment is due at the time and place at which
S See also, Tallon, supra note 2, § 7.02, at 7-6 n.6 (citing French Civil Code art. 1134, para.
3 and U.C.C. 1-203).
Article 7 imposes the observation of good faith in international trade. Even if the
text seems limited to interpretation [of the Convention], this principle has a much
wider scope, in agreement with many national systems. It permeates the buyer's
obligations in a general way. But two specific applications may also be detected;
articles 54 and 60(a) both deal with the preliminary acts required of the buyer for
the exact performance of his obligation to pay the price and to take delivery. Id.
at 7-6.
6 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 1, at 81.
7 Such risk would result in loss, if for instance, the seller shipped the goods to a foreign
country and the buyer refused to pay, the seller as a practical matter might be forced to sell his
goods at a price below the contract price rather than incur the added expense of either'storing his
goods or shipping them back to his place of business at a loss. Again, the parties may vary the
effect of the Convention by agreement. Because "[Pirocedures for payment are of concern to
parties and usually are dealt within the contract; Article 58 provides answers to the above questions
only when the contract is silent (Art. 6)." HONNOLD COMMENTARY, supra note 1, §333 at 344.
In addition, there is a concern that,
[ujnder domestic rules of procedure, jurisdiction and venue for an action for the
purchase price are often at the place of payment, with the result ... that the place
of business or habitual residence of the seller, being the place of payment [under
CISG], automatically fixes the forum for an action for payment of the purchase
price .... Buyers are thus well advised to seek a more favorable choice-of-forum
clause in the contract. SCHtLECHTRIEM, supra note 1, at 82.
Honnold suggests a further problem: "[i]f the plaintiff does not obtain a judgment at the
place where the defendant has assets, the plaintiff may face the problem of obtaining recognition
of the judgment in a second State." HONNOLD COMMENTARY, supra note 1, § 332, at 343 n.5.
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the buyer is to receive the documents, regardless of where the goods are to be
received.8
On matters of payment, Article 58(1) provides that unless otherwise agreed,
payment is due at the time when .the seller places either the goods or the
documents controlling their disposition at the buyer's disposal: "[I1n short, goods
are to be exchanged for the price."9 In this respect, the Convention coincides
more closely with U.C.C § 2-310 and § 2-507(1)."° Article 58(3), like U.C.C.
§ 2-513 and § 2-310(b), allows the buyer to inspect the goods before payment,
unless the procedures for delivery or payment agreed upon by the parties are
inconsistent with the buyer's opportunity to inspect.
With regard to price, Article 59 provides that the price is due on the date
fixed by the contract or the Convention "without the need for any request or
compliance with any formality on the part of the seller." This is meant to do
away .with legal requirements such as the French mise en demeure or the
German Mahnung." In line with the Convention's non-mandatory character,
however, "a formal notice of default could be agreed upon despite its exclusion
by article 59. ".' Article 60, mentioned above, restates the buyer's obligation
to take delivery, adding that the buyer must do all the acts which could
reasonably be expected of him in order to enable the seller to make delivery.
B. Remedies of the Seller
The remedies of the seller are found in Articles 61-65. These provisions
parallel the remedies available to the buyer under Articles 45-52 for breach of
8 "U.C.C. § 2-310(a)...seem[s] to respond to domestic conditions by calling for dispatch of the
goods with payment for the goods at the point of receipt (destination)." HONNOLD COMMENTARY,
supra note 1, § 331, at 342 n.4.
9 Id. § 335, at. 345.
0 However, from the point of view of semantics, the Convention places greater emphasis on
payment while the U.C.C places greater emphasis on tender of-delivery. Article 58(1) says the
buyer's payment (seller may even make it a condition) is due when the seller tenders the goods or
documents, whereas 2-507 says the seller's tender of delivery is a condition (unless otherwise
agreed) to the buyer's duty to pay. Both essentially contemplate a simultaneous exchange, the
opposed phraseology may offer some insight into the attitudes of the different systems.
n HONNOLD COMMENTARY, supra note.1, §340 at 350-351 :
This provision was inherited from ULIS 60, which was designed to overturn the
rule of some Continental legal systems that a party may not recover damages for
delay unless he has given an advance warning or protest directed at delay .... In
any event, in connection with the delivery the seller will normally send the buyer
an invoice that would be understood as a request for payment .... In documentary
exchanges...the seller does not place the goods 'at the buyer's disposal' (Art.58(1))
until he informs the buyer that the goods are ready .... At this point Article 59
makes it clear that the buyer must pay without any 'request or... formality'.
12 Talon, supra note 2, §7.02, at 7-5, 7-6.
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the seller's obligations. 3 Article 61 allows the aggrieved seller several
remedies, including the right to claim damages as provided for in Articles 74-77.
Articles 74-77 constitute a comprehensive section on damages which "sets forth
familiar formulae based on market differential [Art. 76], resale price [Art 75],
and the cost of cover [Art. 75], and it establishes limitations based on
foreseeability [Art.74] and mitigation [Art.77]."' 4 The exercise of any other
remedy, however, will not deprive the seller of the right to claim damages (Art.
61(2)).
The primary remedies of the Convention are "uncharacteristic of the
common law" and are likely to be "strange to the common lawyer."" Unlike
the common law, the Convention allows both parties to the contract to extend
the time for performance. Specifically, Article 63 allows the seller to fix an
additional period of time for performance by the buyer as long as the time
extension is reasonable. During this additional period, "often referred to in the
literature as Nachfrist, from its partial similarity to a German institution of that
name.. . .the party fixing the period cannot resort to any remedy for breach
of contract, ,16 unless the other party has indicated that he will not perform.
If, for instance, the buyer fails to perform within the additional time fixed, the
seller may avoid regardless of whether the breach is fundamental (Art.64(1)(b)).
This avoids the risk involved for the seller in determining whether breach was
fundamental, since in any other situation the seller may only avoid a
fundamental breach (Art. 64(1)(a)). 7 If the seller has avoided the contract for
fundamental breach, or failure of the buyer to perform within the Nachfi'st
period, "the seller is relieved of responsibility to perform under the contract
[Art.81(1)] [and has] a right to restitution of whatever it has
'supplied'[Art. 81(2)] [; [the seller, however, must) return whatever the buyer has
'paid under the contract' [Art.81(2)]. "18
" Discussed in Ziegel, The Remedial Provisions in the Vienna Sales Convention: Some
Common Law Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS §9.04 at 9-29 (N. Galston & H. Smit.
ed. 1984) [hereinafter Ziegel]; HONNOLD COMENTARY, supra note 1, §344, at 354; and Fletchner,
Remedies Under the New International Sales Convention: The Perspective From Article 2 of the
U.C.C., 8 J.L.& CoM. 53, 65 (1988) [hereinafter Fletchner].
14 Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an International
Interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REv. 607, 612 (1988) [hereinafter Kastely].
IS Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L. LAW. 443, 458 (1989) [hereinafter Garrol, and Nicholas,
The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law, 105 LAW Q.REv. 201,225 (1989) [hereinafter
Nicholas].
36 Nicholas, supra note 15, at 225.
'7 Fundamental breach is defined in Art. 25 as a breach which results in "such detriment to the
other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless
the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same
circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.
s Flechtner, supra note 13, at 65.
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The remedies of the seller in the U.C.C. are found in sections 2-702 to
2-710. Section 2-703 is analogous to Article 61 of the Convention in that it is
"an index section which gathers together in one convenient place all of the
various remedies open to a seller for any breach by the buyer."19 Article 61
is unfortunately not as comprehensiye as U.C.C. § 2-703. While including a
reference to Articles 81, 85, and 88 would effect a more comprehensive section,
no such reference is made in the Convention. "An Article 2 seller has similar
[to those of a seller under the Convention] rights and obligations as long as the
buyer breaches without continuing to accept the goods,""° but, unlike the
Convention seller's right to avoid (which is not limited to non-acceptance
situations), "[an Art.2] seller has extremely limited rights to 'undo' an exchange
after the goods have been accepted by a breaching buyer. "2
In short, under Article 2 of the U.C.C. the seller's normal remedy if the
buyer accepts the goods is an action for the price. The seller's right under the
Convention to avoid the contract, claim restitution of goods that have been
accepted, and recover resale or market-price damages represents a significant
departure from the U.C.C. Article 2 scheme of remedies.22
Under Article 62 of the Convention "the seller may require the buyer to
pay the price, take over delivery or perform his other obligations, unless the
seller has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement." As
Professor Garro notes, "[t]he Convention's provisions more startling to the
common law lawyer's traditional perception of remedies are those concerning
'9 U.C.C. § 2-703 comment 1 (1990). Like the Convention, "[tihis Article rejects any doctrine
of election of remedy as a fundamental policy and thus the remedies are essentially cumulative in
nature and include all of the available remedies for breach. Whether the pursuit of one remedy bars
another depends entirely on the facts of the individual case." Id.
2 Flechtner, supra note 13, at 65. For instance, in a credit sale, "an Article 2 seller can
reclaim goods that have been accepted only if the buyer received them while insolvent and either
the seller made demand within ten days after receipt or the buyer misrepresented solvency in
writing within three months before delivery [U.C.C. §2-702(2)]." Furthermore, "successful
reclamation in a credit sale . . . precludes 'all other remedies' including the right to resale or
market-price damages [2-702(3)]." Id. at 66.
21 Id. at 66.
1 Id. at 66-67. See also Gonzalez, Remedies Under the U.N. Convention for the International
Sale of Goods, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 79, 87 (1984) [hereinafter Gonzalez):
Under the Convention, the fundamental nature of the breach is the test for
immediate cancellation in all cases, whether the breach is effected by the buyer or
the seller and whether it occurs before or after the acceptance of the goods. In
contrast, under the U.C.C., fundamental breach applies only after goods are
accepted [U.C.C. § 2-601). Prior to acceptance, perfect tender is the rule; the
innocent party may avoid a contract if the goods delivered, but not accepted,
deviate in any way from the goods contracted for. The U.C.C. perfect tender rule
is less appropriate in the international context, however, where there is no
guarantee of efficient communication facilities, storage facilities, or a market for
the goods at the destination point. In addition, the U.C.C. perfect tender rule is
somewhat oriented toward consumer protection, an area completely beyond the
scope of the Convention.
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specific performance."I Under Article 28, however, "a court is not bound to
enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do so under
its own law." This provision "would not, of course, protect a party from a
common law country against the granting of specific performance by a court in
a civil law country."I The end result of these conflicting provisions is
discussed below.
II.ARE OPEN PRICE CONTRACTS ALLOWED BY THE SALES CONVENTION?
A. Open-Price Contracts Under the U. C. C
Section 2-305 abrogates the rule under pre-Code law that "sales contracts
were expected to be definite, at least on the essential points . . . . [I]f an
agreement was reached but no price set, the contract was treated as an
'agreement to agree. 'I Under § 2-305, such a contract may be enforceable.'
The key to enforceability is "the dominant intention of the parties to have the
deal continue to be binding upon both."27 As Professor Quinn puts it, "the
critical question is not whether the price has been left open, but whether the
parties agreed to close a deal with finality and leave the price term open or
flexible."28 Under such a contract, "the price is a reasonable price at the time
for delivery. "29 Where there is no intent to be bound, there is no contract. "In
2 Garro, supra note 15, at 458.
24 Id. at 459.
25 T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST 2-110 (1978)
[hereinafter Quinn].
'- U.C.C. § 2-305 (1990):
Open Price Term.
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is
not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set
or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good
faith.
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement of the parties fails to be fixed
through fault of one party the other may at his option treat the contract as cancelled or
himself fix a reasonable price.
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the price be fixed or agreed
and it is not fixed or agreed there is no contract. In such a case the buyer must return any
goods already received or if unable so to do must pay their reasonable value at the time of
delivery and the seller must return any portion of the price paid on account."
2 U.C.C. § 2-305 comment 1 (1990).
2 QUINN, supra note 25, at 2-110.
29 U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1990). U.C.C. § 2-305(2) requires that where the seller is to fix the
price he must fix a price in good faith. Both the "reasonable" and "good faith" limitations are
absent from the price-setting rule in the Convention, Art.55: "the parties are considered, in the
absence of any indication to the contrary, to have impliedly made reference to the price generally
charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold under comparable
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such a case the buyer must return any goods already received or if unable so to
do must pay their reasonable value at the time of delivery and the seller must
return any portion of the price paid on account.""3 Therefore, the U.C.C.
allows the formation of open-price contracts.
B. Open-Price Contracts Under the Convention
While there ara practical uncertainties about when an open-price contract
will be enforced under the Code,31 substantially more confusion exists under
the Con,ention as to whether parties, even those who intend to be bound, can
validly conclude an enforceable open-price contract. The confusion starts with
Article 14(1), which states:
A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more
specific persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and
indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of
acceptance. A proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the
goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for
determining the quantity and the price.32
As in the U.C.C., "[The basic criterion for an offer, under prevailing law
and the Convention, is whether one party has indicated to another the intention
* to be bound in case of acceptance."" Honnold is of the opinion that,
[Sitanding alone, this language [Art. 14] would suggest that if an offer does not
expressly or implicitly fix (or make provision for determining) the price, the
offer is not sufficiently definite for acceptance and the formation of the
contract."' Although he argues that this reading must be refuted because of
contradictory language in Art. 55, one can reject it before even resorting to
textual reconciliation.3" As he notes elsewhere, Article 14 might be read as
simply giving an illustrative case in which the parties can be sure of satisfying
the requirements of definiteness. It does not say that anything less will fail for
indefiniteness. Those who insist on reading the illustrative statement in Article
14(1) as a minimum threshold are simply erecting a false conflict with Article
55 of the Convention. In fact, when read in conjunction with that article, it
circumstances in the trade concerned."
30 U.C.C. § 2-305(4) (1990).
31 Id.
32 Unchanged from 1978 Draft Convention Art. 12. ULF Art. 4 (1) requires an offer to be
"sufficiently definite" and to indicate the "intention of the offeror to be bound," but does not
mention price or minimum requirements for definiteness.
HONNOLD COMMENTARY, supra note 1, § 133, at 160.
Id. § 325 at 337.
SId. § 137 at 163 & n.8.
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becomes clear that Article 14(1) was not meant to bar open-price contracts.
Article 55 contains the price-setting mechanism for open-price contracts:
Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly
or implicitly fix or make provisions for determining the price, the
parties are considered, in the absence of any indication to the
contrary, to have impliedly made reference to the price generally
charged at the time of conclusion of the contract for such goods
sold under comparable circumstances in the trade concerned. 6
The language "[W]here a contract has been validly concluded" assumes that
such a contract may be validly concluded." When the drafters of the Draft
Convention added the word "validly" to the ULIS language (which simply said,
"when a contract has been concluded..."), did they intend to refer to validity
under the Convention (ie, back to Article 14), to validity in respects other than
definiteness, or to national laws on validity?38 Honnold, we have already
noted, favors a reading referring to validity in other respects than
indefiniteness.39 Farnsworth disagrees, so that "article 55 could not have
effect .... [Qithers, myself included, are less sanguine that bootstrapping will
carry the day if a controversy under the Convention arises in a period of rapid
price fluctuation in the courts of a country that is not as receptive to open price
terms as the United States is under the Code."' But Professor Garro argues
that "in a codified set of rules such as the Convention, every effort should be
made to construe seemingly incompatible provisions in order to make sense out
of them. "41
I The Draft Convention of 1978 referred to "'the price generally charged by ihe seller at the
time of the conclusion of the contract.' The Diplomatic Conference, responding to objections that
this formula might give effect to excessive or unfair prices charged by the seller, changed this
formula to 'the price generally charged... for such goods sold under comparable circumstances in
the trade concerned."' Id. § 327 at 339. In ULIS Article 57 the word "validly" is not included:
"Where a contract has been concluded but does not state a price ... " ULF also refers to "the
price generally charged by the seller."
7 Id. § 325 at 337-338.
s Art. 4(a) states that the Convention does not govern issues of validity.
3 Honnold interprets validity to refer to "substantive" validity. Even if "validly" 'referred to
valid under Art. 14 (1), Honnold would read 14(1) broadly to allow open-price contracts. HONNOLD
COMMENTARY, supra note 1, § 325, at 337-338.
0 Farnsworth, Formation of Contract, in INTERNATIONAL SALES : THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 3.04, at 3-9 (N. Gaston
& H. Smit ed. 1984) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH FORMATION].
4! Garro, supra note 15, at 464. But he notes that,
Professor Date-Bah recalls that several delegations sought unsuccessfully to delete
the second sentence of art. 14(1), so that an offer could be held sufficiently definite
even if it did not expressly or impliedly fix the price or make provision for
determining the price. Date-Bah concludes that the implication to be drawn by the
interpreter from the motion's defeat is that there can be no valid 'open price'
contract under the text of art. 14(1), as it now stands. Id. at 464 n.94.
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Tallon raises an issue which should be of greater concern than the false
conflict between Articles 14(1) and 55. The problem arises if "validly
concluded" refers to validity under national legal systems, including
indefiniteness. While the contract is then free of any imaginable constraints to
be found in Article 14(1), "in legal systems such as the French, an agreement
on price is necessary for the validity of a sale (French Civil Code arts. 1589,
1591 and 1592). "' Of course, as discussed above, the U.C.C. represents a
more flexible approach broader even than Article 55, so this should not be a
concern if American law is used to determine a contract's validity under the
Convention.
C. Open-Price Contracts: Conclusion
The stronger arguments seem to lie with those who would read the
Convention to allow open-price contracts, but as Farnsworth has noted, these
arguments may fall on deaf ears if presented in a tribunal where the laws are
inhospitable to open-price contracts. The textual arguments on either side are
sufficiently complicated such that a tribunal could adopt one or the other
depending on its preference. In view of this uncertainty, it would be advisable
for parties engaged in open-price contracts to have a choice-of-law clause falling
back on the U.C.C. as a gap-filler by selecting the law of a U.S. state with a
reasonable relationship to the transaction or the parties, and a choice of forum
clause selecting a forum friendly to open-price contracts (ie, any U.S. state).43
Perhaps the most contorted attempt of reconciliation is recounted by Tallon:
The UNCITRAL commentary on the text of the 1978 Draft Convention (under
article 51) saw the difficulty and came to the conclusion that article 51 is effective
only if one of the parties has his place of business in a Contracting State which has
ratified or accepted the Convention as to Part III (Sales of Goods ) but not as to
Part II (Formation of the Contract) and if the law of that State provides that a
contract can be validly concluded without a price. Such an interpretation could
almost annihilate CISG article 55 since the conditions for its application would
seldom be met. Tallon, supra note 2, at 7-10, 7-11.
But if article 14 is read as Honnold suggests, article 14 is not rendered meaningless, as Tallon
fears.
42 Tallon, supra note 2, at 7-11, 7-12. ("Two recent series of French cases have drawn attention
to this requirement .... These cases have been widely discussed and sometimes criticized ... for
their dogmatic approach and for flowing from 'uncommercial ideas'.").
43 See Farnsworth, Review of Standard Forms or Terms Under the Vienna Convention, 21
CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 439, 447 (1988) [hereinafter Farnsworth Review] :
Articles six and four of the Convention create a tripartite hierarchy in which the
Convention lies at the bottom, the agreement of the parties is in the middle, and the
domestic law on validity rests on top. Prudent drafters ought to re-examine
language for the international sale of goods, even when such language is
dispositive, to protect the special needs of their clients in light of this new tripartite
hierarchy. See also B. Crawford, Drafting Considerations Under the 1980 United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L.&
CoM. 187 (1988).
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III. Is ARTICLE SIXTY-Two AVAILABLE As A REMEDY
IN UNITED STATES COURTS?
A. The Convention: Article 62
Article 62 allows the seller to "require the buyer to pay the price, take
delivery or perform his other obligations."" As noted above by Garro, "[t]he
disparity between civil law and common law traditional perceptions to the law
of sales was particularly evident in the field of remedies. "45 Nowhere is this
more evident than in the remedy of specific performance. In jurisdictions where
the remedy is available, Article 62 only limits the seller's right to compel
performance by requiring that the seller not have resorted to an inconsistent
remedy: 46
The right to demand specific performance is not conditional on the inadequacy
of damages. Thus, in theory, the Convention assumes that specific performance
will be more readily available than substitutional relief. This is consistent with
the traditional preference of civil law systems for specific relief and with the
"The Convention eliminated the following exception found in Art. 61 of ULIS:
The seller shall not be entitled to require payment of the price by the buyer if it is
in conformity with usage and reasonably possible for the seller to resell the goods.
In that case the contract shall be ipso facto avoided as from the time when such
resale should be effected.
HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES : THE
STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS AND DECISIONS THAT LED To THE 1980 UNrrED NATIONS CONVENTION
WITH INTRODUCrIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 156, 178 (1989) [hereinafter, HONNOLD
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. Thus, the Convention rejected a proposal by the United States that "the
seller not have the right to require payment of the price if the buyer has not taken delivery of the
goods and the seller can resell the goods without [unreasonable] [substantial] additional expense or
inconvenience." Id. at 400. Another proposal amended the article to read: "The seller, after he
has duly complied with his obligation under the contract, may require the buyer to pay the price,
take delivery or perform any of his other obligations..." Id. at 344. This proposal, "based on the
proposition that the seller should be able to require the buyer to perform his obligations (in practice,
usually to pay the price) only if the seller had already performed his own obligations under the
contract" was rejected.
[I]t was noted that the contract may call for payment of the price before the goods were delivered
or the contract may require the opening of a letter of credit prior to delivery. It was also pointed
out that the proposal would upset the balance of rights and obligations between the seller and the
buyer.Id.
45 Garro, supra note 15, at 458.
1 For example, "a seller may lose the right to payment under article 62 by declaring the
contract avoided under article 64." Kastely, supra note 14, at 617. At the Plenary Conference,
the delegate of Spain stated :
that his delegation had voted in favor of [article 62] but was not satisfied with the
wording of the concluding proviso 'unless the seller has resorted to a remedy
which is inconsistent with this requirement.' That passage was not at all clear. As
far as he could see, it could only refer to the case in which the seller avoided the
contract. If the seller had not avoided the contract the obligations of both parties
subsisted unchanged. HONNOLD DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 747.
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economic needs of countries with planned economies that lack markets for
substitute transactions.47
B. Article 28 Compromise
While the possibility of specific performance in courts which normally
grant such remedies will not be eliminated,4" in theory, Article 28 eliminates
the possibility of an order for specific performance in a common-law court.49
But to the extent a common-law jurisdiction would grant such a remedy under
its own law, that possibility is not eliminated.' Article 28 was "a clear
4' Garro, supra note 15, at 458-459.
4 Where the remedy of specific performance seems desirable, however, the contracting parties,
may avoid the post-breach uncertainty created by article 28 by specifying in the
contract that specific performance will or will not be available in the event of
breach. Although such terms have been relatively rare in the past, still under the
Convention such a term may be advisable. Kastely, supra note 14, at 641.
Whether such a clause would be effective is questionable, although Kastely argues that it should be
enforceable.
9 Article 28 provides that:
If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled to
require performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to
enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do so under its
own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention.
ULIS Article 16 and Article VII are essentially the same as CISG Article 28. As noted by Honnold
:"[t]he current text.., does not speak of the enforcement of a judgment for specific performance,
a subject thought not to be appropriate for a convention on the law of sales." HONNOLD
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 245. The 1978 Draft Convention was somewhat
narrower, but the following pre-conference proposal by the United States and the United Kingdom
was accepted modifying "the article so that a court would be bound to order specific performance
of a contract under the Convention only if the court 'would' do so in relation to similar contracts
under its own law, rather than whether it 'could' do so as is provided in [the Draft Convention]."
HONNOLD DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 397, 672. Furthermore, "Mr. FELTHAM
(United Kingdom) . . .reminded the Committee ... [t]hat [the ULIS] formulation had been an
attempt to ease the position of those'States whose courts regarded specific performance as an
exceptional rather than a usual remedy.. .[inder the change to 'could'] [t]he effect was to reduce
vastly the protection afforded by the earlier provision to those States whose courts did not readily
grant the remedy of specific performance .... Mr. Wagner (German Democratic Republic) said
that his delegation preferred the present ['could'] text of the Convention, which it interpreted as a
compromise to prevent common law courts from being compelled to do something which they could
not normally do under their law." Id. at 525-526.
o It is important to bear in mind that,
In some legal systems the courts are authorized to order specific performance of
an obligation. In other legal systems courts are not authorized to order certain
forms of specific performance and those States could not be expected to alter
fundamental principles of their judicial procedure in order to bring this Convention
into force . . . .Therefore, if a court has the authority under any circumstances
to order a particular form of specific performance, e.g. to deliver the goods or to
pay the price, article 26 [CISG Art.28] does not limit the application of articles 42
[CISG 46] or 58 [62]. HONNOLD DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 44, at 417
(Secretariat Commentary).
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compromise impairing the unification of law."I' "Because the draftsmen of the
Convention were unable to agree on a uniform substantive rule, an action for
specific performance will depend on the vagaries of the forum's law."52  In
order to determine to what extent Article 62 is available in American courts, we
must probe the vagaries of specific performance of the buyer in American law.
C. When is Specific Performance Under the Convention Available in the U.S. ?
When Article 28 refers to a "judgment of specific performance," does it
limit its availability to the narrow sense of a decree in equity, 3 or is Article
62 specific performance available whenever a court has power to compel
performance? Honnold's view is that "one cannot be tied to local terminology
in construing the Convention, "' even where the Article refers to the local rule,
and even though "this provision was designed primarily as a concession to the
common law. "55 Since "[l]imiting this phrase to an equity decree in actions by
the buyer would exclude actions such as detinue and replevin, and in common
law settings would have little meaning in actions by the seller."56 Kastely
agrees: "the term 'specific performance' in article 28 need not refer to the
definition of 'specific performance' in the various national legal systems,
S Garro, supra note 15, at 459-460. "Mhe Convention's remedial provisions "reflect an
awkward compromise between two distinct approaches to contract damages." Kastely, supra note
14, at 610. "[A]rticle 28 threatens to undermine the Convention's remedial scheme and to prevent
uniformity in this important aspect of international sales. Id. at 612. "Indeed, article 28 may wreak
havoc on post-breach negotiations under the Convention; it undermines articles 46 and 62 because
an aggrieved party must always fear that a court will not order performance." Id. at 627. Professor
Kastely's article provides the best summary of the reasons for including a broad right to specific
performance : "the law should not force a non-breaching party to accept anything less [than the full
performance of the agreement]" Id. at 614., Kastely's article also includes a thorough discussion
of the Article 28 exception which allows countries that view specific performance as unduly harsh
and inefficient to continue in their own legal traditions. Kastely concludes that none of the reasons
advanced for the Article 28 exception are persuasive, rather they are more reflective of "national
pride." Id.at 627. In addition, Article 28 "poses a significant risk of forum shopping by contracting
parties, a practice disruptive to the Convention's underlying goal of uniformity." Gonzalez, supra
note 22, at 98. For an analysis of the pros and cons of specific performance See Schwartz, The
Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J 271, 296-298 (1979).
52 Garro, supra note 15, at 459-460.
" "In addition to enforcement by contempt the most distinguishing aspects of an action for
specific performance are that there is no right to a jury trial....and the various equitable defenses,
such as unclean hands, public policy, laches and the like, apply." Kastely, supra note 14, at 634
n. 128. See also, Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief, 27 AM. J. COMF. L. 247, at 249-50:
To begin with, the words 'judgment for specific performance' suggest that the
provision does not apply to a suit in which the seller tenders the goods to the
recalcitrant buyer anclaims the price. Such a suit traditionally one at law rather
than in equity, is not commonly thought of as one for 'specific performance,' even
though it gives the seller relief that might accurately be described as 'specific'."
See also, TRErrEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE AccouNT, 47-71,
73-74.
5 HONNOLD COMMENTARY, supra note 1, § 348, at 357.
55 HONNOLD COMMENTARY, supra note 1, at 358 n.6. See also, Ziegel, supra note 13, at 9-31.
m Id. (emphasis added).
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[particularly considering that] the detailed meanings of 'specific performance'
in English are not necessarily paralleled in each of the six official languages of
the Convention. 57
Under the prevailing view, then, there would be no need to determine
whether the analogous U.C.C. provision, Section 2-709, is in fact "specific
performance."I' But Honnold believes that the remedy would be restricted to
its availability under § 2-709. That section is obviously more restricted than the
broad right given in the Convention.59 In contrast, Flechtner considers that "it
I Kastely, supra note 14, at 634 & n.131.
5 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 1, at 84 n.333a :"Whether an action for the price is a form of
specific performance is controversial. In the end, it is merely a problem of denomination, because
no one doubts that the action is enforceable against the buyer."; See Anderson, The Code's Action
For the Price: A Survey, 1 GEORGIA STATE U.L.REv. 27, 28-29. :
The price action remains the most attractive of damage remedies to sellers and their
attorneys because it forces the buyer to honor his promise specifically ....
Indeed, the price action under section 2-709 has been described as a specific
performance remedy [See Schumann v. Levi, 728 F.2d 1141, 1143, 38 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 131, 133 (1984); Central 11. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Consolidated Coal Co., 527 F. Supp. 58, 65, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 278, 278
(C.D. Ill. 1981)]. This is an apt description as long as it is kept well in mind that
the price action is an action at law, whereas specific performance is a remedy in
equity. Equitable iemedies are, generally, discretionary with the court and are not
a matter of right for the plaintiff. Remedies at law are a matter of right. If the
aggrieved seller carries his burden of proof that his case fals within one of the
three exceptions of section 2-709, he is entitled to the action for the price as a
matter of right.
In this sense § 2-709 would seem more similar to Article 62 than to the narrow equitable "specific
performance". See also, HILLMAN, McDoNNEL, AND NICKLES, COMMON LAW AND EQUITY
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 9-28 (1985): "A seller's action for the price is similar
to an action for specific performance, since, when awarded, a seller recovers the price and, under
Section 2-709(2), must hold the unsalable goods for the buyer"); and YORIO, CONTRACT
ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS, § 11.4.1, at 306 & n. 1 (1989): "For
the seller of goods, an action to recover the price is the analogue of specific performance and
replevin on behalf of the buyer. See U.C.C. § 2-716 comment 4 (1990): (Code section on specific
performance and replevin 'intended to give the buyer rights to the goods comparable to the seller's
rights to the price'.)"
59 U.C.C. § 2-709 (1990):
Action for the Price:
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the'price as it becomes due the seller may recover, together
with any incidental damages under the next section, the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a
commercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and
(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reasonable effort
to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that
such effort will be unavailing.
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for the buyer any goods which have
been identified to the contract and are still in his control except that if resale become
possible he may resell them at any time prior to the collection of the judgment. The net
proceeds of any such resale must be credited to the buyer and payment of the judgment
entitles him to any goods not resold.
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected or revoked acceptance of the goods or has failed
to a make payment due or has repudiated (Section 2-610), a seller who is held not entitled
to the price under this section shall nevertheless be awarded damages for non-acceptance
under the preceding section.
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is less clear [than for the buyer's right to specific performance] whether a U.S.
court could restrict the seller's right to the price under Article 62 . . . to
situations where that remedy would be available under U.C.C. § 2-709(1)."'
Kastely raises an additional thorny question about the interaction of Article
28 and forum law: Does the phrase "unless the court would do so under its own
law" include its own law regarding the 'choice-of-law', or only its local
substantive law?
If article 28 refers to the forum's choice of law rules as well as to
its contract law, then the issue of specific performance may be
governed by a law which is inconsistent with the forum's own
contract law. At the least, the practical effect of such an
interpretation would be to resurrect difficult choice of law issues
in many international contract disputes, and to make enforcement
of the right to performance recognized by the Convention even
more uncertain.61
For Kastely, "[tlhe rationale of article 28 clearly suggests that the issue of
specific performance should be governed by the forum's domestic contract law,
without reference to the choice of law rules .... "62 But the Article 28
reference to a forum's own law "does not require a court to apply its law [of
specific performance] to a contract governed by the Convention; it simply allows
the court to follow domestic law if it so chooses."'" That is, even though
forum law does not require specific performance, a court has discretion under
the Convention to grant specific performance, since Article 28 was adopted
precisely to avoid forcing national courts to do what they were not authorized
to do.'
D. Conclusion: Specific Performance
As the reader will by now have discovered, the "vagaries" and
uncertainties surrounding the availability of specific performance are hard to
penetrate. Although a contractual approach, as suggested by Kastely, would
seem to be protected by the freedom of contract principle underlying the
Convention, and by the parties' right to vary the effect of the Convention under
60 Fletchner, supra note 13, at 60 n.32.
6' Kastely, supra note 14, at 637.
62 Id.: "It would be anomalous to say that the Convention will not directly require such legal
systems to grant specific performance, but that it will require them to apply the law of some other
legal system that may require specific performance."Id at 638.
63 Id.
' Id. See also Gonzalez, supra note 22, at 97: "The forum court may still enforce the
Convention's broader scope of specific performance. Under article 28 it is simply not required
to do so."
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Article 6, it is uncertain whether a common law court will honor the decision
of the parties on this issue. If the seller is seeking specific performance and
does not meet the requirements of 2-709, then, the only option left to him would
be to "forum-shop" - away from American or common-law courts.
